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Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance
It is commonly accepted that the present deposit
insurance system encourages excessive risk-taking
because itgives depositors little incentive to
monitorthe financial condition ofthe institutions
where they place their funds. Moreover, since
bank regulators allow undercapitalized institu-
tionsto continue in operationeven afterthey have
exhausted theirnet worth on amarket-valuebasis,
the incentive to take excessive risk is greatly
enhanced. Closing failing institutions promptly
would eliminate much ofthis distortion in risk-
taking, but such a goal is practically unattainable
given the difficulties inherent in measuring the
market value of insured institutions. As a result,
some form ofdirectcontrol over risk-taking is
needed. Last week's Letter considered risk-
adjusted pricingofdeposit insurance and found
that, because oflimitations in our ability to
appraise the market value of insured institutions
and the riskiness oftheir portfolios, it may not be
the panacea its proponents claim.
Another approach to the deposit insurance prob-
lem is the regulation ofbank portfolios. Such an
approach has received bad press of late because,
its critics argue, the regulators havenotkept banks
from undertaking excessive risks. A review of
recent headlines concerning bank failures and
problem loans (particularlytoenergy-related firms
and to lesser-developed countries) would tend to
confirm this view. Moreover, from the standpoint
ofeconomicefficiency, regulation seems, at first
glance, a less desirable approach because it
arbitrarily imposes uniformity and thus prevents
insured institutions from taking advantage of
differences in risk preferences and various
economies (e.g., specialization, information, etc.)
that would, in the absence ofregulation, generate
social benefits. Despite these drawbacks, how-
ever, a regu latory approach to the problem of
excessive risk-taking is worth aseqlnd look.
Restrictive covenants...
Oneofthe criticisms lodged against regu lation is
that itproduces lessefficientresults than "market-
oriented" approaches. However, the existence of
restrictive covenants in private long-term debt
contracts suggests that, even in private market
agreements, some formofoutright "regulation"of
risk-taking may, at times, be more efficientthan
pricing. In the long-term debtmarket, one ofthe
greatest risks faced by investors is the possibility
that the issuing firm will not be declared bankrupt
until it has more than exhausted its equity capital
and has therefore jeopardized the value ofthe
bondholders' investments. In theory, the pricingof
long-term debt could take this possibility into
account. However, the premium required might
be so high thatnomarketfor long-term debtwould
exist. Consequently, thefirm's shareholders and its
long-term creditors find it mutuallybeneficial to
agree to restrictthe firm's risk-takingoptions instead.
These covenants generally place restrictions on
the issuing firm's dividend, financing and/or
investment policies by specifying, forexample,
the percentage ofretained earnings that can be
paid out in dividends or the minimum amountof
capitalization the firm must have. Violations of
these covenants give the bondholders the right to
renegotiate the terms ofthe indenture oreven to
declare the firm in default and then to seize
collateral or accelerate the maturityofthe debt,
possibly forcing the firm into bankruptcy.
...and bank regulations
Bank regulation has much in common with these
covenants. Regulations regarding, amongother
things, loan concentrations, insider transactions
and capital adequacy standards constrain banks'
investment and financing choices and serve to
protect the deposit insurance fund from the same
kinds ofrisks faced by bondholders. Regulations
limiting (in proportion to a bank's capital) both
concentrationsofloans toany given borrowerand
transactions between a bank and its executive
officers, directors or principal shareholders are
similar to bond covenants that place restrictions
on thetypes ofassets afirm can acquire. Likewise,
regulations regarding debt issuance and pledged
assets constrain banks' abilities to dilutethe claims
ofthe insurance fund as do bond covenants
restricting a firm's ability to issue new debtwith
claims seniorto those ofexistingdebtholders.
Also, like many bond contracts, bank regulators
require that banks have an adequate system of
internal audits and thattheypurchase insurancetoFRBSF
protect against certain types ofrisk such as theft,
fraud and employee infidelity.
The most significant check on the actions ofa
bank's shareholders is the enforcementofcapital
adequacy standards. A minimum capital standard
limits the extentto which a bank can issue more
depositsandthereby increasethe sizeofthe FDIC's
liability without also increasing the aggregate
value ofthe shareholders' exposure. Policies on
bank capital also significantly constrain a bank's
ability tofollow risky lending and investment
policies. Typically, banks are required to subtract
from their capital base the (book) value of loans
thatthe regulatorsdeem to have ahigh probability
ofdefault. Such an approach forces shareholders
to recognize capital losses and thus to absorb
more ofthe costs ofrisky lending policies. To the
extentthat such capital policies are stringently
enforced, the price ofbank stock should reflect
this, providing some private market discipline of
bank risk4aking.
Given all the similarities between restrictive bond
covenants and bank regulations, itappears that, in
theory at least, the regulatory approach can ad-
dress the problem ofbank risk-taking effectively.
However, this begs the question whether the
current regulatory limits on banks' activities are
stringent enough to be effective. For example, the
FDIC has recently set a minimum capital-to-total-
assets ratio of5Y2 percent forthe banks it insures.
The FDIC has also stated that higher capital
standards will be set for banks that are considered
riskier. (Capital includes reported equity capital,
reserves-including loan loss reserves-and
mandatory convertible subordinated debt, netof
loans the FDIC has classified as having a high
probability ofdefault.) Given the large losses
incurred by the FDIC over the last few years ($2.2
billion between 1980and 1983), however, itisfair
to say that this standard is probably not stringent
enough. Reliance on reported (i.e., book value)
equity capital further weakens the effectiveness of
this regulation since the existence ofunrealized
losses or highly uncertain earnings prospects
frequently causethe marketvalueofbankequities
to fall belowtheir bookvalues.
Enforcement
The establishmentofsufficiently stringent regu-
latory standards is only halfthe battle, ofcourse.
Those standards mustthen be enforced. The
regu lators musthavethe authorityand thewiIIing-
ness totake appropriate action when an institution
violates a regulation. Whether bank regulators
have adequate authority to enforce their regula-
tions is a subject ofsome debate, at least among
the regulators. For example, the FDIC has sought
legislation to give the agency full enforcement
powers overthebanks itdoes notsupervisedirect-
Iy. (Currently, the FDIC supervises onlythe state-
chartered nonmemberbanks, whiletheComptrol-
leroftheCurrency aFld the Federal Reserve System
supervise, respectively, the nationally chartered
banks and the state-chartered member banks.)
As a group, however, bank regulators have
substantial powers to enforce regulations. These
powers include the authority to enter into formal
and informal agreements with offending banks,
thwartoffending banks' expansion plans, issue
cease-and-desist orders, impose civil money
penalties, suspend/remove bank officers and
directors and, in the case ofthe FDIC, terminate
deposit insurance coverage. Compared with the
enforcement powers granted bondholders
(e.g., authorityto renegotiate the terms ofthe
indenture, seize collateral and accelerate the
maturity ofthe debt), the bank regulators' powers
stack up quite well.
As a first step in inducing a bank to change its
behavior, the regulators attempt to obtain some
agreement from the bank to rectify the problem
(including a plan to increase capital, ifappro-
priate). Examinations are then scheduled at more
frequent intervals to monitorthe bank's efforts to
change its practices. ShouId agreements and more
frequent examinations prove ineffective, the
regulators may decide to deny a bank's applica-
tions to expand. This approach has been used, for
example, as a means offorcing a bankto improve
a seriously impaired capital structure. The bank
regulators have been criticized, however, for not
making greater use ofthis authority. For example,
bank regulators could have used this authoritymore extensively as a means ofpreventing bank
capital ratios from dropping duringthe 1970s
and early 1980s. The declinewas especially
pronounced at the large banks, where capital fell
belowfive percentofassets between 1978
and 1981.
The regulators also havethe abiIitytothreaten and
initiate legal proceedings againstabank. However,
becauseofthecosts and delays involved in impos-
ingthese sanctions, the regu lators generallydonot
resort to them except in the mostextreme cases.
Cease-and-desist authority, for example, has been
used only in cases ofserious multiple infractions,
such as insiderabuses, unsafe lending practices
and serious impairmentofcapital. Likewise, civil
moneypenalties are notgenerally imposed until a
bank has violated a cease-and-desist order, even
though the regulators havethe authorityto impose
penalties underother circumstances. Moreover,
the authority to suspend or remove bank officers
and directors is seldom used.
Finally, the FDIC has shown considerable reluc-
tance to terminate deposit insurance coverage to
reduce its risk exposure. This reluctance is particu-
larly unfortunate since termination ofdeposit
insurance is tantamount to adeclaration of insol-
vency and as such, would help to overcome the
FDIC's lackofauthority to close insolvent institu-
tions. Between 1966 (when regulators were
granted cease-and-desist powers) and 1983, the
FDIC initiated an average ofonly six termination
proceedings a year-far belowthe annual
average of284 banks that were considered
problem institutions over that same period.
Thus, although the regulators have considerable
authority to take actions against a bank that repre-
sents a substantial risk to the deposit insurance
fund, such authority is used infrequently. Ulti-
mately, this reluctance increases the losses borne
by the FDIC and encourages greater risk-taking.
The solution?
The regulatory approach to the problem ofbank
risk-taking has been criticized as ineffective and
economically inefficient. However, the use of
regulation-like restrictive covenants in bond con-
tracts suggests that such an approach is neither
inherently ineffective nor inefficient. Whether the
regulators would design the same regulatory
standards as the private market is, ofcourse, open
to debate. Nonetheless,acomparison ofbank
regulations and restrictive bond covenants reveals
certain similarities, suggesting that the problem
with currentbank regulation is simplythatitis not
stringent enough. Indeed, the need for reform of
the deposit insurance system would seem less
pressing today ifthe regulators had made better
use oftheirexisting authority to control risk-taking.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 181,867 324 5,842 5.5
Loans and Leases1 6 162,873 433 7,518 8.1
Commercial and Industrial 48,945 - 78 2,982 10.8
Real estate 60,583 91 1,684 4.7
Loans to Individuals 28,992 120 2,341 14.7
Leases 5,005 0 - 58 - 1.9
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,835 - 109 - 672 - 9.0
OtherSecurities2 7,159 - 1 - 1,004 - 20.6
Total Deposits 190,380 4,214 - 617 - 0.5
Demand Deposits 45,847 3,687 - 3,390 - 11.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,756 1,130 - 1,575 - 8.4
Other Transaction Balances4 12,475 402 - 300 - 3.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 132,058 124 3,073 3.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,946 - 43 - 1,651 - 6.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 40,585 86 2,420 10.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed Monevs 21,425 1,911 - 1,582 - 11.5
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings /











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately